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Natural Law and the Ninth Amendment
By THOMAS E. TOWE*
In Griswold v. Connecticut,1 the famous Connecticut birth control
case, Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion, dusted off a consti-
tutional amendment which had virtually lain dormant since its
adoption in 1791. Joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Bren-
nan, Justice Goldberg invoked the ninth amendment as authority
for the adoption of a constitutional right of privacy.
2
The ninth amendment stated: "The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." Justice Goldberg contended that
this amounted to constitutional recognition of the existence of other
fundamental rights in addition to the fundamental rights enumer-
ated in the first eight amendments. These additional fundamental
rights are then given effect as against the states by the fourteenth
* B.A. Earlham College; LL.B. University of Montana; L.L.M. George-
town University; S.J.D. (candidate) University of Michigan. State Senator;
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm.; Senior Partner with Towe, Neely &
Ball.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Although the ninth amendment had been urged as the basis for pro-
tection of certain rights in several cases prior to Griswold v. Connecticut,
only once before had the Court recognized that it might protect certain con-
stitutional rights and then it did so without discussion. United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946). See PArr-nsoN, THE FORGOTTEN
NIn'rH AiwDvmErr 29-32 (1955) for a summary of other cases in which the
ninth amendment was unsuccessfully raised as grounds for relief.
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amendment. Thus, the right of privacy-a right which is not
included in the first eight amendments-cannot be infringed by
state legislation.8
Justice Black disagreed vehemently with Justice Goldberg on this
point. Such an interpretation, he claimed in his dissent, would give
the Supreme Court unlimited power to hold state laws unconstitu-
tional whenever the Court believed the legislative policy on which
they were based was unreasonable, unwise, or irrational.
The adoption of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for
holding laws unconstitutional ... will amount to a great unconsti-
tutional shift of power to the courts which I believe and am con-
strained to say will be bad for the courts and worse for the coun-
try.4
The framers of the ninth amendment certainly would not agree
that it presented such a loose, flexible, and uncontrolled standard
that it would give unlimited power to the judiciary. Aside from
the question of whether the constitutional framers intended the
Supreme Court to have the power of judicial review, the phrase,
"certain rights . .. retained by the people" had a very definite
meaning to the men who fought a revolution to protect "certain un-
alienable rights."5  These rights were natural rights; according to
John Locke, they were reserved to the people when man left the
"state of nature" by forming a "social compact."6 These rights were
derived from "self-evident" truths and no government could deny
them to the people. James Otis, in a 1764 pamphlet, spoke of
"natural inherent and inseparable rights" that would remain even
if the charter privileges of the colonies were disregarded or re-
voked.7 As Vice President, John Adams was the presiding officer
of the Senate when that body passed a bill proposing the Bill of
Rights as a group of amendments to the Constitution. Twenty-six
years earlier, as he embarked on the career that was to make him
one of the most important leaders of the Revolution and the new
Republic, he wrote:
3. 381 U.S. 479, 486-99.
4. Id. at 521.
5. Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776. See POUND, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBEirY 73-75 (1957).
6. See LOCKE, Two TsRATIES or GOVERNMENT 169-70, 186 (Cook ed.
1947). See also the VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 1. (June 12, 1776).
7. OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (1764)
quoted in C.P. PATTERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 49-50 (1953) [hereinafter cited as C. P. PATTERSON].
I say RIGHTS, for such [the poor people) have, undoubtedly,
antecedent to all earthly government,-Rights, that cannot be
repealed or restrained by human laws-Rights, derived from the
great Legislator of the universe.8 (Emphasis in original.)
Thomas Jefferson declared in 1774 that the rights of Americans
were "derived from the laws of nature." In summarizing the
philosophical background to the American Revolution, C. P. Patter-
son says:
Natural rights, in conclusion, was a juristic conception regarded
as embodied in immutable law. Violations of natural rights by the
English Parliament were null and void since contrary to natural
justice. To the forefathers, these rights were not merely moral
beatitudes, abstractions of the Age of Reason, but irrevocable rights
conferred by the "law of nature and nature's God"-the basis of
all law, to which man-made law must conform in order to be law.10
As our forefathers saw them, there was nothing arbitrary or
indefinite about natural rights. The power of the judiciary implicit
in the ninth amendment was clearly intended to be limited by
natural law."
Since 1791, however, natural law has fallen from favor among
many legal philosophers. To many it has "become an anachronism,
out of harmony with the thought and needs of the times. '12 Justice
8. 3 ADAMS, WORKS 449 (1851). See also C.P. PATTERsoN, supra note
7, at 463.
9. JEFFERSON, SUMMARY VIEW (1774) quoted in C.P. PATTERSON, supra
n.7, at 52.
10. C.P. PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 49. The principle author of the
Bill of Rights was James Madison. For a discussion of his views on natural
law and natural rights see BARNS, JAMES MADISON, PHILOSOPHER OF THE CON-
STITUTON 71, 78-83, 87, 126, 163-67 (1938). In summarizing Madison's views
on natural rights, Barns states:
Guaranties of freedom of speech, of religion and the press, trial by
jury, exemption from unlawful searches and seizures, and the other
natural rights which are reserved when the political compact is en-
tered into are the prime requisites of free government. To a certain
extent it is desirable to embody them in a formal declaration or
bill of rights, although there is the danger that such a declaration
may not be interpreted with sufficient latitude, with the result that
a definite enumeration of rights may provide a pretext for the vio-
lation of other rights not enumerated. But whether a bill of rights
is drawn up or not, these essential elements of the law of nature
constitute an absolute limitation upon the powers of government
which neither the legislature nor any other agency can modify or
evade [at 166].
See letter to Jefferson in 1 MADISON, WirrIGs 423-27 (Cong. ed. 1865). See
also the reference to "immutable laws of nature" in Declaration and Re-
solves of the First Continental Congress, 1 JOURNALS OF TH= CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 67 (Ford ed., Gov't Printing Office, 1904).
11. See PATTERSON, Tim FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMEN'r 20-23, 53 (1955);
Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309,
313 (1936); Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitu-
tional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928).
12. Gardner, Legal Idealism and Constitutional Law, 10 VLL. L. Rrv.
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Black claimed that natural law did not present any meaningful
limitations; under a natural law formula, courts "roam at will in
the limitless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness .... -13
Further, he believed that the natural law formula had too often
been used to invalidate legitimate state regulation of business activ-
ities.14 Finally, he contended that "the 'natural law' formula...
should be abandoned as an incongruous excrescence on our Consti-
tution."'15 It is the purpose of this article to make a careful exam-
ination of the natural law theory to see if it can present any
guidance in the modern world to the type of problem that is
presented by the ninth amendment. In other words, does the doc-
trine that was so influential during the founding of our nation have
any effective utility for the same country in the last half of the
twentieth century?
I. CRITICISMS OF NATURAL LAW
Before embarking on a discussion of the adaptability of natural
law to the present day legal realities, it is necessary to outline some
of the criticisms that have been levied against natural law. Natural
law generally involves a belief in the existence of absolute princi-
ples based on the nature of man. From these principles a body of
law can be derived that will best organize the life and activities of
man. The principles themselves are discovered by the application
of reason to a study of the nature of man or of the nature of the
universe, either with or without guidance and assistance from God.
These principles are nearly always considered absolute, universal,
and immutable. 16
Most critics of natural law deny man's ability to prove with cer-
tainty the existence of absolute principles. According to David
Hume, morality is not based on reason but is based on sentiment,
feeling and passion.' 7 Thus, to the extent that these principles are
1, 37 (1964). See also SEARLE, SPEECH ARTS (1969); Searle, How to Derive
an 'Ought' from an 'Is', 73 PHIL. REV. (1964). Contra, Perkins, Natural Law
in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, 14 AM. J. JuRIs. 54 (1969).
13. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92 (1947) (Black, J. dissenting).
14. Id. at 68-92.
15. Id. at 75.
16. For a sample of traditional natural law thinking see the legal philos-
ophies of Aristotle, Cicero, Saint Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Hugo
Grotius and John Locke.
17. HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 463-69 (Bk. III, Part I) (Selby-
Sigge ed. 1888).
moral principles, they cannot be determined with mathematical cer-
tainty. Jeremy Bentham stated that man may have certain natural
inclinations but these inclinations should not be called law. They
are nothing but natural sentiments of pleasure or pain.' s Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes insisted that what an individual regards as
truths are really nothing but dogmatic and deep-seated preferences.
A person's opinions and beliefs can be fully understood only by a
study of that person's own background and environment. Viewed
in this light, it is apparent that the opinions and beliefs accepted
by one person will not necessarily be accepted by others; such deep-
seated preferences cannot even be argued about constructively
because "you can not argue a man into liking a glass of beer."' 9
Thus, according to the critics of natural law, absolute principles
which can be proved with mathematical certainty are non-existent.
Even if natural law principles could be proved as absolute for one
society at one time, they certainly could not be proved as absolute
for all societies at all times. According to Joseph Kohler, just as
culture varies from time to time and from place to place so does
law. He claimed that the law that is suitable for one period is not
necessarily suitable for another, and similarly the law that is suit-
able for one society is not necessarily suitable for another.20  In
the words of Professor Allen:
The moment we have disengaged some principle of which we think
to say, with a sigh of relief, 'Well, that at least is an indispensable
element of all law', some patient investigator into the legal systems
of the Houyhnhnme in the mist of antiquity will discover a frag-
ment of stone or pottery which disturbs all our conclusions. 2'
This view is reinforced by the realization that man does not
presently know all there is to know about the universe. Professor
Goble explains that even in the field of physical sciences, principles
that were once thought irrefutable have been forced to yield to the
discoveries of modern science. If we cannot be certain about the
immutable nature of principles which govern the behavior of the
physical sciences, continues Professor Goble, we certainly cannot be
certain about principles which govern the behavior of man. The
introduction of life and consciousness into the study introduces
factors which are far more difficult to calculate than the factors
18. BENTHAM, THE THEORY or LEGISLATION 83 (Odgen ed. 1931).
19. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 311-12 (Essay on Natural Law
originally appearing in 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1918) (1920). O.W. HOLMES,
Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 311-312 (1920); this essay orig-
inally appeared in 32 HIARv. L. REv.
20. KOHLER, PHImosoPHY OF LAW 5 (Albrecht trans. 1914); PATON, JURIS-
PRUDENCE 108-09 (3rd ed. Derham, 1964) [hereinafter referred to as PATON].
21. ALLEN, LEGAL DUTIEs AND OTm ESSAYS IN JUISrIUDENCE 4 (1931).
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involved in inanimate things.2  How can we be sure that a future
discovery about the nature of man will not undermine our present
belief in a particular absolute principle? Thus, the universality and
immutability of absolute principles cannot be proved.
In addition, there are several other criticisms which have been
raised in regard to natural law. First, how can we be sure that even
if man's behavior does conform to nature it will be good behavior?
How can we be sure that all man's natural tendencies are good
ones? In other words, even assuming we can discover principles
based on the nature of man with infallible certainty, how can we
be sure that these are ethically good principles? 23 Second, Profes-
sor Goble claims that natural law does not respect man's diversity
in background, experience, tradition, tests and aptitude. By con-
trast, according to Goble, natural lawyers try to fit each man's
thought and faith into a specified pattern, i.e., absolute principles.
The result is intolerance for conflicting views and beliefs. Natural
law, therefore, tends to ignore new situations, new knowledge, and
deeper insights; it retards change.2 4
Third, Professor Goble is concerned about the question of who is
given the authority to determine what the absolute principles are.
He claims that natural lawyers usually find or create natural law
principles to support whatever they want to believe. Thus, natural
law has been invoked by advocates arguing both for and against
slavery. It has been invoked by opponents of child labor legislation,
of minimum hours for women, and of improvement of working con-
ditions in hazardous industries.25 Since natural law principles can-
22. Goble, Nature, Man and Law: The True Natural Law, 41 A.B.A.J.
403-07 (1955) [hereinafter referred to as Goble, Nature, Man and Law].
See also HOLMES, supra note 19, at 315-16.
23. This argument is suggested by Hans Kelsen in Kelsen, Plato and
the Doctrine of Natural Law, 14 VAmN. L. REV. 23, 29-33 (1960).
24. Goble, Nature, Man and Law, supra note 22, at 474-75; Goble, The
Dilemma of the Natural Law, 2 CATH. L. 226, 235 (1956).
25. Goble, Nature, Man and Law, supra note 22, at 473. See generally
16 AM. JUR. 2d § 330. See also Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188
N.W. 613 (1922) (recognizing a natural affection between parents and off-
spring which will be protected by the Constitution as a natural right;)
Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 ('1925) (which recognized
the right to beget children as a natural right in a sterilization of the insane
case); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Case, 380 P.2d 34 (Colo.
1963) (recognizing a natural right to acquire a home for one's self and de-
pendents); Carrol, Natural Law and the Freedom of Communication Under
not be proved with scientific certainty, it is not surprising that
natural lawyers are not in agreement as to either the absolute
principles or the application of these principles. This inconsistency
in the theoretical sphere is undoubtedly what prompted Justice
Black to state that court members guided by natural law "roam at
will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness
and actually select policies. '20
Fourth, Hans Kelson and other followers of John Austin, claim
that natural law theory tends to confuse the question of what law
is with the entirely separate question of what law should be.2 7
Finally, natural law prevents man from creating moral precepts
himself. Professor Goble says that by creating such precepts him-
self, rather than having them given to him by nature or by God,
man achieves a higher sense of responsibility and a broader sweep
for freedom of thought than natural lawyers are willing to give
him.28
II. REPLIES OF CONTEMPORARY NATURAL LAWYERS
Attempts have been made to answer most of these criticisms. At
the beginning of the twentieth century there was a "revival of
natural law."'29 This revival has taken many forms and there are
nearly as many "renaissance" theories of natural law as there are
natural law philosophers. Two such theories briefly need to be
reviewed. The first is sometimes referred to as the neo-scholastic
philosophy of law based on the theories of St. Thomas Aquinas. It
is perhaps the most widely accepted natural law theory, especially
among catholic lawyers, in current legal thinking. The second is
the neo-Kantian juridical idealism based on the theories of Imman-
uel Kant. Rudolph Stammler is the principle advocate of this
theory which has played an important role in modern jurispru-
dence A0
Representative of the neo-scholastic philosophy is Father William
the 14th Amendment, 42 NOTRE DAME L. 219 (1966); and for a discussion
of the Privileges and Immunities clause as giving practical effect to natural
rights via the fourteenth amendment see Gardner, Legal Idealism and Con-
stitutional Law, 10 VML. L. REv. 1, 29-37 (1964).
26. Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575,
599, 601, n.4 (1942) (Black, Douglas & Murphy concurring) quoted in
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 92 (1947) (Black J., dissenting).
27. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE, xv (Preface) (Wadberg
trans. 1949). See also PATON, supra note 20, at 17.
28. Goble, The Mutibility of Law, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 95, 109 (1959).
29. 1 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 179 (1959).
30. According to Roscoe Pound, Stammler "has undoubtedly been the
strongest single influence in philosophical jurisprudence in the present
century." Id. at 143.
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Kenealy, who vigorously insists that his views are representative of
and would be accepted by other neo-scholastic philosophersY1
Further, Father Kenealy scrupulously avoids reliance on religious
principles or church doctrine in advancing his position and in his
direct replies to many of the criticisms mentioned above.32 Accord-
ing to Father Kenealy, true natural law, namely, classical natural
law in the scholastic tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas,
does not claim universality and immutability for all rules. Only
certain basic principles are universal and immutable. These basic
principles consist of a single primary principle, namely, "What is
good ought to be done, and what is evil ought to be avoided,"3 3 and
a few secondary principles immediately inferable therefrom. 34 The
truth of this primary principle cannot be proved or disproved
because it contains a moral "ought." As the logically first "ought,"
however, it is immediately self-evident-no one can deny it-and
therefore its universal and immutable application can be objectively
established.3 5
By "good," Father Kenealy means "suitability or conformity to
nature. '36 The quest for knowing what is in conformity with
nature, and therefore is good, is aided by the secondary principles.
31. Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CAm. L. 259, 261 (1955). Other
neoscholastic legal philosophers who are perhaps better known than Father
Kenealy are Heinrich Romman and Frangois G~ny. Father Kenealy was
a Professor of Law at Loyola University of Chicago and the former Dean
of Boston College of Law, currently residing in a Boston Seminary.
32. Father Kenealy wrote three articles on this subject: Whose Natural
Law?, 1 CATH. L., 259 (1955), reprinted in 17 CATH. L. 268 (1971); Scholastic
Natural Law-Professor Goble's Dilemma, 2 CATH. L. 22 (1957); The Im-
mutable Foundation of Law, 11 HASTINGs L.J. 440 (1959). All three were
written in reply to the criticism of natural law expressed by Professor
George Goble in Nature, Man and Law: The True Natural Law, 41 A.B.A.J.
403 (1955); The Dilemma of Natural Law, 2 CAm. L. 226 (1956); and The
Mutability of Law, 11 HASTiNGs L.J. 95 (1959). See also Fagan, The Goble-
Kenealy Discussion-Two Comments, 2 CATH. L. 324 (1956); Constable, The
False Natural Law: Professor Goble's Straw Man, 1 NATURAL L.F. 97 (1956).
33. Kenealy, The Immutable Foundation of Law, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 440,
443 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as Kenealy, The Immutable Founda-
tion].
34. Id. at 442.
35. Id. at 448-49. See also id. at 441-42. Father Kenealy expressly re-
jects faith as the basis for the establishment of the primary principle.
Kenealy, Scholastic Natural Law-Professor Goble's Dilemma, 2 CATH. L.
22 (1957).
36. Kenealy, The Immutable Foundation, supra note 33, at 443.
The human mind, inspecting essential human nature, immediately
perceives things that directly pertain to the perfection of man.
These are life, liberty, property, reputation, sexual faculties and
such basic principles as can be found embodied in the Ten Com-
mandments. These immediate specifications of the primary prin-
ciple are also immediately self-evident, incapable of either proof or
disproof, and can be objectively established as universal and im-
mutable.8 7
Lesser important principles and positive law are derived from
these basic principles; the basic principles constitute a norm with
which positive law should be consonant. 8 The implementation of
this norm is a task of man and since man is not infallible, the posi-
tive law that results cannot be absolute, universal or immutable.
Nevertheless, man should use all the scientific wisdom and data
from the social sciences at his command in applying these basic
principles to the constantly changing political, economic and social
conditions of the civil society.89 It "is a monumental and perpetual
task demanding the constant devotion of the best brains and the
most mature scholarship of the legal profession. ' 40 In this way
natural law, according to Father Kenealy, does not retard change
but, in fact, insists on a constant search for a better system of laws
for the civil society.41
As the founder of the neo-Kantian juridical idealism, Rudolf
Stammler attempted to separate form from content. He recognized
that content because it is based on historical and empirical matter,
is always subject to change.42 The method for determining when
the content of a specific law is just, however, it not necessarily sub-
ject to change, according to Stammler. Such a universally valid
method is discovered by seeking insight into the uniformity of law
in general. 43  In using this process, Stammler discovered that
every system of law necessarily has one thing in common, namely,
that those persons subject to it can struggle for existence with
greater success by joining together. Thus, by joining the commu-
nity everyone is at the same time serving himself best.44 The uni-
versal element of law is the idea of adjusting the individual desire
to the purpose of the community. From this insight, Stammler
37. Id. at 450.
38. Kenealy, Scholastic Natural Law, supra note 35, at 26.
39. Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATH. L. 259, 260 (1955).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. STAMMLER, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE 90 (Husik trans. 1925) [herein-
after referred to as STAMMLER].
43. Id. at 135.
44. Id. at 152.
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derived a social ideal. The purpose of the community should be to
combine all of the objective aims (as opposed to subjective aims)
of its individual members. The social ideal, therefore, is a commu-
nity which comprehends in a unitary fashion all possible purposes
of persons united under the law; it is a community of men willing
freely. 45 In other words, Stammler stresses the social interests in
individual ends; each citizen should make as his own purposes or
desires, the purposes or desires of others which can be justified
objectively rather than subjectively.46 This act is the first step in
the universal method of achieving objective justice.
The second step involves two general categories of principles
which are derived directly from Stammler's social ideal. First,
there must be an atmosphere of mutual respect.47 Second, persons
must receive their necessary share in the community of which they
are members. 48 These principles serve as a general formula by
which concrete historical and empirical data of particular cases
should be evaluated. The method of subsuming doubtful questions
of right conduct under these principles is unitized into what Stam-
mler called "the model for just law.' '49 This model consists of the
notion of a special community into which the opposing or conflict-
ing volitions of persons are mentally brought for the purpose of
objectively adjusting these volitions. It is strictly a theoretical
community which is based on the notion that every member of it
has a good reason for claiming respect and has a right of participa-
tion. 50 Finally, the making of a correct judgment in a particular
case is what Stammler called his fourth step in finding just law.5 1
Stammler carefully distinguished ethics from law. Law, he
claimed, deals with the reciprocal relationships of man in his
society. Ethics, on the other hand, is a personal thing; it deals with
the perfection of the individual or the purification of man's inner
being. Thus, pure justice, which deals with problems of law, is not
45. Id. 153.
46. 1 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 150 (1959); GANY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN
DROIT PRIV POSTIF (See STAMMLER, supra note 42, at 493, 521 for transla-
tion of Chap. 6 of GLNY).
47. STAMmLER, supra note 42, at 161.
48. Id. at 163.
49. Id. at 212.
50. Id. at 212, 215.
51. Id. at 212.
burdened with ethical considerations.5 2 Once the principles of just
law have been determined, however, ethics should unite with the
concrete consequences of those principles "to lend to the cold and
dry commands of just law the warm and fresh stream of a devoted
will and an unchanging resolve to do the right. '53  The united
methods of ethics and just law will, according to Stammler, open
the path to that "ideal thought of the highest unity of being. '54
Both the theories of Father Kenealy and Rudolph Stammler have
attempted to avoid excessive reliance upon highly questionable
abstract principles. Father Kenealy confines his reliance on uni-
versal and immutable principles to one relatively innocuous and
undeniable primary principle plus several immediate specifications
of the primary principle which he claims are also self-evident and
undeniable. Rudolph Stammler confines his reliance on universal
and immutable principles to an abstract notion of pure justice with
both ethics and substantive content extracted. To this extent they
have made natural law much more acceptable than the seventeenth
and eighteenth century natural law philosophies of Hobbes, Pufen-
dorf, Spinoza, Locke, and Rousseau. Nevertheless, they both still
accept the existence of universal and immutable principles. Al-
though they may have solved the problem of how to cope with
changing empirical data, they have not solved the problem of how
we can be certain about the universality or immutability of any
principle. How can we be sure that future discoveries about the
nature of man will not disprove Father Kenealy's primary and
secondary principles? How can we be sure that Stammler's ab-
stract notion of justice can be used effectively in all societies for
all time?
It may be true that Father Kenealy's primary principle is, when
viewed in the abstract, undeniable. However, to say that good
ought to be done and evil ought to be avoided tells us precious little
about what we ought to do until we are given a definition of good
and evil. Father Kenealy defines good as that which is in conform-
ity with nature and evil as that which is in difformity with
nature.5 5 Such a definition involves an assumption that cannot be
proved, namely, whatever conforms with nature is good. Man's
limited knowledge of the universe does not equip him with the
information that is necessary for him to prove the absolute cer-
tainty of the truth of such an assumption. In fact, Hans Kelsen
52. Id. at 62-64.
53. Id. at 71.
54. Id. at 487.
55. Kenealy, The Immutable Foundation, supra note 33, at 443.
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raises the question of whether man's bad tendencies do not conform
to nature just as much as his good tendencies. 56 The same thing
can be said for his secondary principles. For example, the principle
that "no one ought to deprive another unjustly of his .. .prop-
erty, '5 7 is based on the assumption that private property is a neces-
sary element in any society. Future revelations about the nature
of the universe may someday reveal to our fallible minds that pri-
vate property is not a necessary element in every society.
Rudolph Stammler's universal principles of just law are also
based on certain basic assumptions which he cannot prove. He
assumes that every system of law should have as its fundamental
purpose the furthering of the objects of each of its members.
Stammler cannot prove that non-human objects, such as the con-
servation of certain animal or plant life which has no conceivable
utility for man, should not also be furthered. Furthermore, he has
assumed that mutual respect for the individual and mutual partici-
pation in the community are sufficient guides to permit an evalua-
tion of all positive laws." The possible existence of other criteria
presently known or to be revealed in the future is obvious. In the
final analysis, therefore, both the neo-scholastic philosophy of
Father Kenealy and the neo-Kantian philosophy of Rudolph Stam-
mler prove unconvincing and unsatisfactory in our modern world.
These same general criticisms can be levied at nearly every modern
natural law theory.59
III. THE NEED FOR AN IDEAL STANDARD
Nevertheless, natural law does have some very important advan-
tages. G. W. Paton states that natural law was particularly effec-
56. Kelsen, Plato and the Doctrine of Natural Law, 14 VAND. L. REV.
23, 29-33 (1960).
57. Kenealy, The Immutable Foundation, supra note 33, at 450.
58. STAMMLER, supra note 42, at 215, 156-66.
59. See, e.g., the legal philosophies of L. DUGuITr, TRAIrA DE DROIT CON-
STITUTIONEL (3rd ed. 1927); J. DABIN, THEORIE GENRALE DU DROIT (2d ed.
1969) (for an English trans., see WILK, THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK,
RADBRUCH AND DABIN, THE 2OTH CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES, Vo1. iv.
(1950) [hereinafter referred to as WILK, THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK,
RADBRUCH AND DABIN]); J. DABIN, Is There a Judicial Law?, in THE NATURE
OF LAW (GOLDING ed. 1966); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); F.
G&NY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF (1925); G. W. Conu-
stable, A Response to Professor Perkins, 17 AM. J. JuRIs. 111 (1972); as
well as those of Heinrich Romman, Joseph P. Maguire and John Wild.
tive during the middle ages. He claims that modern theories of law
based on commands or on the general will of the community would
probably have been inadequate in these times:
Since the fall of Rome, Europe was steering uneasily between the
two dangers of tyranny and anarchy-Austinian theories might lead
to the first, and, in the absence of a cohesive community, the doc-
trine of the general will may lead to the second. Men sought for
a law that was based on something more enduring than the wills
of man, that could provide an element of unity in the battle against
chaos and an element of protection against the arbitrary will of a
sovereign.60
Natural law did both.
It would be foolish to claim, even in our modern world of highly
developed nation states, that the twin dangers of tyranny and
anarchy have been completely eliminated. A recent history of
nearly any of the underdeveloped countries of the world should
easily verify this point. Anything, therefore, which can provide an
element of unity in the battle agains chaos and an element of pro-
tection against the arbitrary will of a sovereign should be very use-
ful even today. Speaking of a much later period, Roscoe Pound
appraised the results of the natural law theory in the following
language:
So long as men were agreed as to the main features of ethical
custom, [natural law] thought was a powerful agency of growth.
It led each jurist to work out ideal standards to serve as a critique
of the traditional law in every detail. It led to many a bold stroke
for judicial improvement of the common law .... 61
Natural law can still be a powerful agency of growth in a modern
society. Natural law always searches for a standard-an ideal
standard-which can be used as a critique for evaluating and
improving the positive law. If a standard could be found which
could receive widespread acceptance in the social community, I do
not believe that proof of this standard's immutable and universal
validity would be crucial to its effectiveness. Acceptance is prob-
ably more important than either universality or immutability.
According to Paton:
Even if the philosopher could prove the validity of a scale of values,
that would not of itself influence actual legal systems, save in so
far as that scale of values was accepted by the ruling classes in
each community.6 2 (Emphasis supplied.)
There has always been widespread acceptance of certain basic
values in the Unitel States,"8 as there has been in every stable
60. PATON, supra note 20, at 98.
61. POUND, LAW AND MORALS 96 (1924).
62. PATON, supra note 20, at 123.
63. "We hold these truths to be self-evident-that all men are created
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democracy. The success of a democracy depends, not upon theoreti-
cal rules or formal constitutional documents, but upon the wide-
spread and common acceptance of democratic values by the people.
The use of the Constitution of the United States as a model for the
framing of many of the constitutions adopted by Latin American
countries and many other countries in the world has not guaranteed
a stable democracy in those countries. Despite the tremendous
success of the English constitutional system in England, Britain has
had only limited success in transplanting this system to its former
colonies in Africa and Asia.64
But acceptance of a vaguely articulated group of basic values is
not enough. There must be room for growth. There must be a rec-
ognition that our society is subject to change and as it changes the
basic concept of values will change. New values will be created and
the importance of certain old values will be diminished. This much
seems clear both from empirical evidence and from the continual
insistence of the critics of natural law. In order to correlate and
coordinate this change an ideal standard is needed to constantly
evaluate and test the basic values.6 5 Furthermore, some standard
is needed to evaluate the numerous and diverse values that con-
equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776. Although the application of the
basic values represented by this statement has frequently varied and al-
though there has been much argument over their true derivation, I doubt
whether anyone would seriously contend that their basic content has not
always been widely accepted by the people of the United States. These
values, plus certain other fundamental values implicit in the Constitution
of the United States are placed near the top of the scale of values; in a
general sense they serve as both a unifying and limiting standard for evalu-
ating other values.
64. "The secret of the English success [in achieving a stable democracy]
lies not in the method, but rather in the temper of public opinion." PATON,
supra note 20, at 133. See Tows, PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES-SWITZER-
LAND, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, JAPAN 54-60 (Ms. 1961). See also CARTER,
RANNEa, HERz, MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS 758 (Rev. ed. 1952). However, the
constitutional history of all the South American countries, without excep-
tion, has been violent and turbulent at some time during their nearly 150
years of independence. WIwus, 4'EcA, LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY (5th ed.
1963).
65. Justice Holmes makes the following statement about ideals: "Man
is born a predestined idealist, for he is born to act. To act is to affirm
the worth of an end, and to persist in affirming the worth of an end is
to make an ideal." HOLMES, SPEECHES 96-97 (1918).
stantly vie for acceptance in society's market place of ideas. Ac-
cording to Constable, without some
standard to measure the true and the good, we are simply in a
sea of relative and unstable subjective values with no logical basis
of preferring one value to another, no principle of heirarchy or
permanent validity among goods.06
In short, there would be nothing to prevent value anarchy.
Even natural law's critics agree that some fundamental values
must be recognized and protected.6 7  In fact, many recent legal
philosophers have dealt extensively with societal and individual
values. 8 The recent German legal philosopher, Gustav Radbruch
(1878-1949), claimed that legal philosophy should study legal values
but not attempt to choose between them. 9 Certain key values,
namely, justice, expedience, and certainty of the law, are antinomic
and contradictory to each other. Since "[p]hilosophy is not to re-
lieve one of decisions," Radbruch saw no defect in the failure of a
particular theory to resolve these contradictions. 70 The choices in-
volved should be a matter of conscience; tolerance is essential. The
law of a country, therefore, is a tentative compromise between
ideals that are logically irreconcilable. 71 It seems to me, however,
that this very compromise represents a reconciliation of sorts. In
fact, to continue the analogy further, without some sort of recon-
66. Constable, The False Natural Law: Professor Goble's Straw Man, 1
NATURAL L. F. 97, 101 (1956).
67. See, e.g., Bentham's four subordinate ends of civil law in BENTHAM,
THE THE.ORY OF LEGISLATION 96 (Ogden ed. 1931); Kelsen's concept of the
basic norm in Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 50 L.Q. REv. 474 (1934),
51 L.Q. REv. 517, 518-20 (1935)); Kohler's "jural postulates of our times"
in PATON, supra note 20, at 120; Austin's "Divine Law" in AUSTIN, JURIS-
PRUDENCE 174 (5th ed. Campbell ed. 1885); and Goble's reference to "moral
values that have stood the test of time and experience" Goble, Nature, Man
and Law, supra note 22, at 403, 476.
68. See, e.g., Emil Lask and Gustav Radbruch in WILK, THE LEGAL PHI-
LOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND DARIN, supra note 59. 1 POUND, JURIsPRu-
DENCE, chs. 7 & 8 (1959); PATON, supra note 20, at 119-59; Harvey, The Chal-
lenge of the Rule of Law, 59 MICH. L. REV. 603 (1961); Bodenheimer, Case
Against Natural Law Re-assessed, 17 STA. L.R. 39, 42 (1964).
69. PATON, supra note 20, at 122.
70. RADBRUCH, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, (trans. in) WILK, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES,
LASK, RADBRUCH & DABIN, supra note 59, at 107-12.
71. PATON, supra note 20, at 123. Radbruch sees a triangular battle be-
tween the ends of law. The conservative wants security; the radical wantsjustice; and the individualist wants greater emphasis put on ethical values.
This conflict, according to 'Radbruch cannot be solved by theory, but only
by sovereign choice of such community as that community struggles to
make those adjustments which are necessary for its existence. After World
War II, Radbruch altered his position slightly; he accepted the necessity
for a theory of minimum absolutes. See a summary of Radbruch's post
war "conversion" in Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HiARv. L. REV. 593, 616-18 (1958).
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ciliation, the society would slip into anarchy whenever a compro-
mise was unattainable. Further, if there is no ultimate or ideal
standard to serve as a guide to this reconciliation, the society could
easily slip into tyranny.
72
IV. THE REQUISITES OF A SATISFACTORY IDEAL STANDARD
The term ideal standard as it is used here is a general measuring
rod under which all of the basic values a particular society wishes
to protect can be subsumed. Care must be taken in formulating
such a standard. First, since no standard can be proved universally
or immutably valid, we must recognize that the ideal standard will
be based on one or more basic assumptions whose truth must be
accepted as a matter of faith.7 But the ideal standard will be of
72. This course of events is exactly what happened in Radbruch's own
country; when Hitler asserted values of race supremacy, militarism, and
conquest there was no generally accepted ideal standard by which these
values could be tested and rejected. However, I believe that if the lawmak-
ers in Germany had been constantly striving for an ideal scale of values
which implied a search for the proper role of each individual in his own
society, in the society of mankind, and in the universe, the respectable lead-
ers of that society may have been in a better position to refute Hitler's
values. Any accepted values which have as their foundation and keystone
the perfection of all men, rather than just a certain class of men, would cer-
tainly have been inconsistent with the values Hitler urged people to accept.
See infra section on "The Third Requisite-Assist in the Struggle Against
Tyranny and Anarchy." Much has been said about the failure of Germany's
positive law tradition to check the rising tide of "National Socialism." See,
e.g., Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REv. 630, 658 et seq. (1958). Since Germany was not the only
country to have a positive law tradition (e.g., England), the empirical
evidence does not fully support this conclusion. If the rise of Nazism can
be attributed to the failure of any theory of law, I would say it would be
the failure of the natural law philosophers to come up with an ideal stand-
ard that both could have received widespread acceptance among the people
and could have enabled the people to see more clearly the evil in the values
that Hitler was thrusting upon them.
73. Both Justice Holmes and Professor Goble recognize the importance
of starting out with an assumption established only by faith. "We all, the
most unbelieving of us, walk by faith. We do our work and live our lives
not merely to vent and realize our inner force, but with a blind and trem-
bling hope that somehow the world will be a little better for our striving."
HOLMES, SPEECHEs 93 (1918).
We believe many things we cannot prove. We act daily upon the
basis of faith.... I believe in the greatness of my profession, my
country and its national traditions, though I cannot prove that they
are worthy of my faith. I believe inthe beneficient power of love,
sympathy and charity though I cannot comprehend their meaning.
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little value unless it can receive considerable, if not widespread, ac-
ceptance by the members of the community. To receive such accep-
tance, the basic assumptions will have to be reasonable in view of
the existing body of empirical knowledge. Second, we must be able
to subsume all of the values considered basic to the needs of society
under this one ideal standard. At the same time, however, it must
not be so vague and so general that it fails to provide a significant
guide to the evaluation of all the possible values and interests that
may emerge from the creative imaginations of the people. Third,
it must provide some help in man's struggle against tyranny and
anarchy. Finally, it must be sufficiently definite to provide sta-
bility and sufficiently flexible to promote tolerance.
A theory of natural law based on an ideal standard which met
these requisites would either avoid or satisfactorily meet the criti-
cisms that have been levied against the natural law theory. It
would not insist on the acceptance of universal and immutable prin-
ciples derived from the nature of man. It would make no pretense
of obtaining moral absolutes from abstract reasoning. It would not
confuse the existing law with what should be the law; but would
clearly distinguish the ideal standard by which the positive law was
to be evaluated from the positive law itself. It would not contend
that the study of human nature holds some magical key to justice,
goodness, and perfection of man. Finally, it would recognize and
tolerate a difference of opinion as to moral values and it would even
encourage change.
There are several possible ideal standards. If the claim of univer-
sality and immutability is taken away from the neo-scholastic posi-
tion one such possible ideal standard would emerge, namely, "What
is good ought to be done and what is evil ought to be avoided. '7 4
As previously explained, however, this standard offers little, if any,
guidance unless a meaningful definition is given to the words
"good" and "evil." Father Kenealy's definition of "good" namely,
"suitability or conformity to nature," may provide a meaningful
definition but it is based on the assumption that human nature
holds some magical key to justice and goodness. Inasmuch as bad-
ness may conform to nature as well goodness, such a basic assump-
tion does not appear to conform well with the existing body of
knowledge and, thus, probably would never receive widespread ac-
ceptance.
I believe in the moral and spiritual values of our religious and cul-
tural heritage, but I cannot prove that they are eternal verities. I
believe in these things because their truth seems more probable
than their falsity.
Goble, Nature, Man and Law, supra note 22, at 403, 405.
74. See supra note 33.
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Another possible ideal standard would be Stammler's theory of
a just law unattached to its claim of universal and immutable valid-
ity. However, more than justice is involved in a good legal system
and the twin principles of mutual respect and mutual participation
would not be sufficient to adequately evaluate all the values that
might contend for acceptance. Ethical considerations should not be
entirely excluded from this evaluation process. A possible ideal
standard might be Bentham's principle of utility, namely, to provide
the greatest happiness for the greatest number.75 Paton claims that
this standard of utility is, indeed, typical' of much natural law
writing.76 Although it is perhaps more acceptable than the first
two, certain difficulties creep into it because of Bentham's total re-
liance on pain and pleasure. 77 Such limited concepts can hardly
present a satisfactory basis for the evaluation of all other values.
Additionally a possible ideal standard might lie in what Pound
calls "the end of law," namely, "the satisfaction of as much of
human demand as we can satisfy with a minimum of friction and
waste.178 If it could be accepted, this would make an excellent
ideal standard. It is somewhat similar to a concept developed by
Paton, namely, "the development of the potentiality of the person-
ality of the common man." The protection and development of the
dignity of man's personality, I believe, should be close to the top
of any scale of values. However, both concepts place man, and man
alone, at the center of things. Too much emphasis on man without
any recognition of an independent importance in other creatures
and creations of God or in God himself may not receive widespread
acceptance in a community deeply imbued with Judeo-Christian
values.
V. AN IDEAL SCALE OF VALUES AS AN IDEAL STANDARD
I suggest that instead of looking to the nature of man, the nature
of the legal system, the maximization of human wants, or the
development of the human personality, we look to the nature of the
universe. Also, that we look to the notion of order, symmetry, and
harmony in the universe for an ideal standard. Implicit in this no-
tion is the proposition that man, as well as other creatures and
75. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 1 (1931).
76. PATON, supra note 20, at 107.
77. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 2 (1931).
78. 1 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 432 (1959).
things, has a proper role in the universe. This role, if achieved, will
bring about the maximum order and harmony. Also, it implies that
man's relations with his fellow man can be perfected into a perfect
order. Assuming that a perfect hierachy of values does exist, then
it follows that man's adherence to this hierachy will bring about
his perfection in both of the senses described above. Thus, the fol-
lowing ideal standard is proposed: that there does exist an ideal
scale of values which presents the best guide for organizing a so-
ciety at any one time. In other words, from the point of view of
any society at a particular time, a perfect hierachy of values does
exist. Hereinafter this shall be referred to as the ideal scale theory.
The ideal scale theory does not specify the values; it just hypoth-
esizes the existence of a perfect or ideal scale. Further elaboration
with the precise values at the precise places on the scale is impos-
sible. The empirical facts that make up the economic, social and
political conditions of one society are not the same for every society.
Thus, the scale of values which is appropriate for achieving the per-
fection of man in one society may be quite inappropriate in another
society. For example, a country with strong tribal rivalries and lit-
tle tradition of national unity like Nigeria may be compelled to
place much more emphasis on national unity than a country such
as Switzerland whose people have enjoyed centuries of joint cooper-
ation as a nation. Further, an appropriate scale of values for a
small village in India would not be appropriate for a similar village
in the United States because of the differing religious, cultural, and
social traditions that affect the lives of the respective villagers.
Thus, each society has its own ideal scale of values and this scale
differs from society to society. Just as there is a hierachy of
societies from that of the smallest village to the society which en-
compasses the whole world, as there is a hierachy of ideal scales.
At the top of the hierachy is one ideal scale of values which
presents the best guide for organizing the entire world.
Also, the scale of values which is appropriate for achieving the
perfection of man in a particular society at one time may not be
the most appropriate at another time. The requirements of an
eighteenth century society may be quite different from the require-
ments of that same society today. As the environment and enligh-
tenment of the individual members change, so will their values
change. Thus, specific values cannot be added to the ideal scale
theory; all the theory can do is to hypothesize the existence of an
ideal or perfect scale of values for any one society at any one time.
The scale of values envisioned by the ideal scale theory is an ideal
or perfect one. It must be acknowledged, therefore, that as a finite
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being with a limited mind, man is unlikey to discover this ideal.
Even if he did chance upon it, he would be unable to recognize the
truth of his discovery.7 9 The value of any theory postulating an
ideal goal is not in the ability to attain the goal but in the process
of attempting to attain it. Similarly, the value in the ideal scale
theory is not in the ability to discover an ideal scale itself but in
the process of attempting to discover such a scale. By continually
attempting to discover and adhere to an ideal scale of values, man
will in the process achieve the best system that he, as a fallible be-
ing, is capable of achieving. Arnold puts this same idea in the
following words:
Law must be a "brooding omnipresence in the sky". This is an
ideal which can never be attained, but if men do not strive for it
the law loses its moral force.80
In writing about Morris Cohen, Hunting Cairns stated:
His final admonition was to recall the ancient wisdom that it is
romantic foolishness to expect that man by his own weak efforts
can make a heaven on earth. But it is the essence of human dignity
* to wear out our lives in the pursuit of worthy though
imperfectly attainable ideals.8'
By creating an ideal goal, therefore, man is continually chal-
lenged to attain that goal; by postulating the existence of an ideal
scale of values, man is continually challenged to discover that scale
and thereby achieve societal perfection.
Keeping in mind the ultimate aim of achieving man's proper role
in the universe and his proper role vis-a-vis his fellow man, a
society must establish a scale of values which it thinks most closely
approximates the ideal scale of values for that society. It may be
contended that agreement on any particular scale of values would
not be possible among a large group of people. Complete agree-
ment, however, is not necessary; widespread acceptance is suffi-
cient. There should be sufficient genuine acceptance of the values
79. Presumably the fact that man's capacities and knowledge are limited
could be contested. The empirical evidence of this fact seems overwhelm-
ing and I would not hesitate to call it an assumption and act on it as such.
See what Professor Goble calls the "true natural law" in Goble, Nature,
Man and Law, supra note 22, at 475. See also FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW
145 (1964).
80. Arnold, Judge Jerome Frank, 24 U. CI. L. REV. 63 (1957).
81. Cairns, The Legal Philosophy of Morris R. Cohen, 14 VAND. L. REV.
239, 244 (1960).
to create a workable consensus upon which the country could cau-
tiously proceed.8 2 Furthermore, perfect agreement as to the loca-
tion of these values on the scale is not necessary to enable the
society to proceed to the tasks of government based on those values.
General agreement as to which values in the society are most impor-
tant and which of the values that frequently conflict should take
priority is sufficient.
As previously stated, most stable democracies do, in fact, have
widespread agreement among their people on a considerable num-
ber of basic values.8 3 In the United States, for example, I believe
that there is general agreement that the individual citizen is
supreme; that all government and all laws exist only for his protec-
tion and well-being. I believe there is general agreement that very
high on the scale of values is the notion that ultimate authority of
any one person or groups of persons should be reviewed periodically
by a system of elections. I believe there is general agreement in
the acceptance of checks and balances to protect the citizens from
the possibility of arbitrary government, and that this value should
be placed very high on the scale of values. These checks and bal-
ances would take the form of a separation of government powers,
civilian control of the military, a federalist system of strong local
governments, and a notion of legality or illegality for all govern-
ment action based on the guidance of a written constitution and
clearly enunciated laws and regulations. Finally, I believe there is
a general agreement that the protection of certain fundamental
human rights of individuals is a value that should be placed very
high on the scale of values.8 4 Undoubtedly, there are many other
82. Cf., PATON, supra note 20, at 123 for his comment that there must
be acceptancy by "the ruling classes" in each community; see also Kelsen's
determination of the content of the basic norm-the condition of fact out
of which the order emerges and to which there corresponds a substantial
measure of actual behaviour in Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 50 L.Q.
Rsv. 474 (1934), 51 L.Q. REv. 517, 519 (1935) (Wilson, trans.); H.L.A. Hart's
statement that the secondary rules of recognition and change must be "ef-
fectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its
officials" in HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 113 (1961). I would not be satisfied
with Hart's concept of acceptance of the rule of recognition by the officials
as being sufficient. Instead, sufficient acceptance among all the people to
obtain a genuine and workable consensus should be required. By genuine
acceptance I mean an acceptance that is freely and willfully made by each
individual. The method of measuring and determining this acceptance will
not be an easy task; it will, I fear, remain one of the greatest challenges
to the society.
83. See supra notes 64 and 65.
84. See Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776; U.S. CONST.; POUND,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY (1957); see
also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1971) recognizing the necessity of protecting these rights.
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basic values upon which general agreement could be reached by the
people of the United States.85
The positive law of the United States has provided considerable
elaboration of these values. Behind most of the laws are values
that do receive widespread acceptance. The degree of importance
given by the society to each of these values corresponds roughly to
a scale of values. The scale of values reflected in the laws of the
United States roughly corresponds, with a few significant excep-
tions,6 to what I believe the ideal scale of values should be for the
United States at this time. It is, however, the task of legal writers
and other scholars to continually examine these values and the rela-
tive importance given to them to see if they correspond to each
scholar's concept of the ideal scale of values for the society at the
time. In arriving at his own concept of the ideal scale of values
each scholar should be guided by a desire to achieve the perfect role
of man in the universe and the perfect harmony of man in his rela-
tions with his fellow man.
VI. ARGUMENTS IN DEFENSE OF THE IDEAL SCALE THEORY
Previously it was stated that most natural law principles are
based on certain basic assumptions which cannot be proved univer-
sally and immutably valid. The ideal scale theory is no exception.
85. See, e.g., the eight desiderata of the inner morality of law suggested
in FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (1964). The eight desiderata are as
follows:
1) the need to make rules; 2) the need to publicize those rules;
3) the need for a prohibition against abuse of retroactive legisla-
tion; 4) the need to make rules understandable; 5) the need for
a prohibition against the enactment of contradictory rules; 6) the
need to have the rules reasonable and not to require conduct be-
yond the powers of the affected party; 7) the need to prohibit such
frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his ac-
tion by them; and 8) the need to make the administration of the
rules conform to the actual announced intention of the rules.
86. For example, the importance of the value placed on human life as
reflected by the many laws in this country sanctioning the death penalty
is, in my opinion, grossly under rated. I believe the value of human life
should be moved much higher on the scale of values-high enough so that
it would not yield to the value inherent in the protection of the society
from crime. The California Supreme Court in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.
3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972), seemed to agree with this
philosophy when it stated: "The dignity of man, the individual and the
society as a whole, is today demeaned by our continued practice of capital
punishment." [Id. at 650, 493 P.2d at 895, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 167].
The ideal scale theory is derived from the nature of the universe;
it is derived from the notion of order, symmetry, and harmony in
the universe. 81 It is based upon the assumption that there is order
in the universe and that this order applies to the social behavior
of man as well as the behavior of the physical world. Because
man's knowledge of the universe is imperfect he cannot be certain
as to the existence or non-existence of order in the universe.
Nevertheless, most men do assume that a scientific explanation does
exist for the inconsistent and puzzling phenomena that now con-
front him. In other words, although we do not yet know how a
migratory bird is directed "in a straight line to a dot of an island
in the ocean 3000 miles from its starting point" or how "leaves of
a giant redwood are able to draw their sustenance from the earth
300 feet below,"88 most people do think a scientific explanation does
exist. To refute this would be disasterous because it would destroy
the motive necessary for continuing the search for such an explana-
tion.
The same thing applies to the social behavior of man. We cannot
be certain as to the existence of a perfect method of organizing
man's social behavior. In other words, we cannot be sure a method
of organizing society exists which would allow man to develop to
perfection, namely, to develop in such a way that he could best fit
into his proper role in the universe. However, to refute the exis-
tence of such a method would again be disasterous because it would
destroy the motive necessary for continuing the search for the dis-
covery of the best possible method of organizing man's social be-
havior. Furthermore, there is nothing known to man at the present
time to indicate that there is no order in the universe or that man
does not have a definite role to play in this symmetrical plan for
universal order. Thus, this basic assumption is not inconsistent
with the presently known empirical facts. It is a reasonable
assumption.
VII. THE FIRST REQUISITE-WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE
As just explained, the basic assumption that there is order in the
universe is a reasonable one and is one which is not in conflict with
the presently known empirical fact. Furthermore, nearly every-
one's system of values can easily be adapted to the ideal scale
theory. In fact, most people already have a scale or hierachy of
values which governs their behavior. The ideal scale of values can
be likened to St. Thomas Aquinas's eternal law. Aquinas denied
87. See infra section on "Ideal Scale of Values as an Ideal Standard."
88. Goble, Nature, Man and Law, supra note 22, at 403, 405.
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that all things happened by chance; by contrast he claimed that
there is an unfailing order in the universe which implies the exist-
ence of a government of all things.8 9 The governor of this govern-
ment is, of course, God, and the model or ideal exemplar which
guides his divine wisdom in this government is eternal law9 0
Eternal law, therefore, is the exemplar of universal order; it is "a
dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs
a perfect community." 91 The notion of the exemplar of universal
order and the notion of a perfect community governed by God are
not inconsistent with the notion of an ideal scale of values. The
ideal scale of values is, in effect, God's plan for life on earth.92
On the other hand, for those who are more secularly inclined, the
ideal scale of values can be likened to an ideal public policy. If the
notion of public policy is comprehensively defined it could include
a full recognition of individual rights. A notion of public policy
which protects freedom of speech, freedom of press, and other fun-
damental rights because it is in accord with public policy to do so
would not be inconsistent with an ideal scale of values.93 For these
reasons, the ideal scale should be widely acceptable; therefore,
it should meet the first requisite of an ideal standard.
89. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMNA THEOLOGICA, Part I, Question 103, Arts.
8 (Vol. 1, 951, 960, PEGIS ed. 1944).
90. Id. Part II, First Part, Question 93, Art. 1 (Vol. 2, 762-64; PEIs
ed.).
91. Id. Question 91, Art. 1 (Vol. 2, 748-49, PEGiS ed.).
92. See Professor Goble's discussion of "the master plan." Goble, Na-
ture, Man and Law, supra note 22, at 476.
Aquinas's contention that eternal law is not fully known to rational crea-
tures is also not inconsistent with the ideal scale theory. ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, supra note 89, Part II, First part, Question 93, Art. 2 (Vol. 2,
764, PEGIs ed.). Natural law, according to Aquinas, is rational creature's
participation in the eternal law. Id. Question 91, Art. 2. The truth or recti-
tude of the common principles which made up this natural law is, according
to Aquinas, the same for all men and is equally known by all men. Id.
Question 94, Art. 4. The contention that there are certain principles that
are true for all men and are equally known by all men is highly question-
able. This contention raises most of the same questions earlier discussed
with regard to the attempts to prove that certain principles are universally
valid. Aquinas's concept of eternal law, therefore, can be useful in under-
standing the ideal scale of values only if it is not inseparably tied to the
notion that certain common principles are equally true for and equally
knowable by all men.
93., See a discussion of public policy as a yard-stick for measuring public
interests in PATON, supra note 20, at 130-32.
VII. THE SECOND REQUISITE-A SIGNIFICANT AND
ALL-INCLUSIVE GUIDE
The ideal scale theory must be broad enough to measure all pos-
sible values and specific enough to be useful: The existence of an
ideal scale of values presuppose a constant and vigorous effort on
the part of man to discover and implement this ideal. Any such
effort must include a consideration of all the possible values that
are brought to his attention. Thus, to work properly, the ideal scale
theory must include a consideration and evaluation of each and
every value that vies for acceptance in the marketplace of ideas.
Each society's own approximation of its ideal scale should include
all the values considered basic to the needs of that society based
on that society's perception of the ideal scale. Every value that pre-
sents itself to the society for evaluation should be considered for
a possible place on that scale.
The much bigger question is whether the ideal scale of values is
so broad and stated in such general terms that it fails to provide
any significant guide to the evaluation of the various values and
interests. I believe it does. In the "sea of values" that is drowning
modern man it is important that a point of departure be established
so that man can make an intelligent and systematic evaluation of
all of the values. The ideal scale of values does exactly this.
Although it says nothing about the substantive content of values
that are included within the scale, it does tell us that we must look
to the whole picture in making our evaluation. It requires a
teleological approach; it looks toward the perfection of man and the
perfection of his role in the universe. It reminds us that, as indi-
viduals or as a society, we are only a part of mankind and mankind
constitutes only a part of the universe. This same idea was stated
by Justice Holmes as follows:
[L]ife is a roar of bargain and battle, but in the very heart of it
there rises a mystic spiritual tone that gives meaning to the whole.
It transmutes the dull details into romance. It reminds us that our
only but wholly adequate significance is as parts of the unimagin-
able whole.94
By requiring us to look to the whole picture in making our evalua-
tion, the ideal scale of values has given us a starting point. Accord-
ing to Morris Cohen, "[w] e need some comprehensive ideal to
organize our conflicting judgments into something like a coherent
body."95 From this starting point the society can proceed to re-
94. HOLMES, SPEEcHEs 97 (1918).
95. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE, AN ESSAY ON THE MEANING OF SCIEN-
TIFIC METHOD 419 (1931).
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search the pertinent historical and empirical data, debate the prop-
ositions, and reconcile the various views. During the course of this
debate, the reminder that our goal is to achieve the proper role of
man in the universe should always provide a helpful assist. Natu-
rally, we will fall far short of achieving that goal on some occasions.
But in the balance, a constant effort to achieve this goal will pro-
duce the best scale of values and, consequently, the best system of
law that fallible beings are capable of achieving. The scale of val-
ues so produced will then be applied by the law makers in their
never ending task of improving the law and the legal system.96
There are three other reasons why the ideal scale of values is use-
ful. First, implicit in the existence of such a scale is the notion
that evaluation of law is a continuous process. As previously
stated, because of man's own fallibility and because of his limited
knowledge of the universe, it is highly unlikely that he will ever
discover this ideal scale-even if he did he would have no way of
recognizing the truth of his discovery. The efforts to discover this
goal, therefore, will never cease. This continuing effort should pre-
vent us from accepting the existing laws, institutions or even basic
values as sufficient. It operates as a built-in mechanism for keeping
law and legal institutions in tune with the times. Second, the
existence of an ideal scale of values challenges us to search for the
perfect method of organizing man's social behavior. It challenges
us to seek man's proper role on the earth and in the universe. In
other words, it challenges us to seek the perfection of man. Third,
the existence of an ideal scale of values to act as a guide in eval-
uating the law provides a noble and honorable purpose or objective
for law. To view the law as a command of the sovereign implies
96. There may not always be general agreement on the basic values that
underlie certain statutes, constitutional amendments, court decisions, or
other legal rules and there will undoubtedly be many times when such gen-
eral agreement will remain unnoticed and unrecognized. Nevertheless, the
more these values are articulated and debated, the better our positive law
and legal institutions will be.
It is not within the scope of this article to determine the responsibility
an individual has towards a law which he feels conflicts with his own scale
of values. On this topic see Wasserstrom, The Obligation to Obey the Law,
10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 780 (1963); Kenealy, Law and Morals, 9 CATH. L. 201
(1963); Greenwait, A Contextual Approach to Disobedience, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 48 (1970); Hughes, Validity and the Basic Norm, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 695
(1971). For a discussion of the importance of "intelligent action guided
by a sense of purpose," see FULLER, THE MoALITY OF LAw 150 (1964).
that the purpose of the law is to provide the sovereign with a tool
to control the people according to its own wishes. The purpose of
law is noble and honorable only so long as the desires of the sover-
eign are noble and honorable. To assume the existence of an ideal
scale of values, however, implies that the purpose of law is to
develop conditions which will help promote the perfection of man
in his proper role in the universe. The society will be in a much
better position if its law makers, from the justice of the peace to
the supreme court justice and from the city councilman to the
national legislator, are guided by this more noble sense of purpose.
Therefore, although the ideal scale of values is broad enough to
measure all possible values it is specific enough to be useful. It
meets the second requisite of an ideal standard.
IX. THE THIRD REQUISITE-AsSIST IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST TYRANNY AND ANARcHY
Does the ideal scale theory discourage tyranny and anarchy?
Prevention of anarchy is one of the primary needs of society and
prevention of tyranny is one of the primary needs of man. Any
standard which has as its goal the perfection of man as a part of
the universe certainly encourages a conformity to the needs of
society and the needs of man. Therefore, logically at least, this re-
quirement is met. As a practical matter, however, would it prevent
tyrannical rule? And, more specifically, would it have prevented
the rise of Nazism in Germany if it had been widely accepted in that
country at the time? No single conclusion to this latter question
can now be conclusively proved by empirical evidence.
A much more sophisticated question is whether the ideal theory
of values provides a restraint on the rulers of a relatively stable
democratic society. I believe it can. Widespread acceptance of a
scale of values to evaluate the law will obviously effect the law
makers in formulating legislation and in making judicial and
administrative decisions. It will provide a higher law for the law-
makers to follow; the lawmakers will be responsible to this higher
law rather than to the arbitrary whims of the sovereign. There-
fore, the ideal scale of values provides some restraint on the law-
makers of a stable democratic society. Admittedly it is not a
panacea; there is nothing to guaranty that a bad scale of values will
not be accepted and there is nothing to prevent a bad lawmaker
or group of lawmakers from ignoring the scale of values even if
it is a good one. Nevertheless, because the emphasis is placed on a
constant effort to achieve the ideal perfection of man, it is probably
the best guaranty against bad law that fallible beings can devise
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in a theory of law. It is certainly better than a theory which pre-
sents no restraints at all. The ideal scale of values, therefore, meets
the third requisite for an ideal standard.
X. THE FOURTH REQUISITE-PROVIDE STABILITY
AND PREVENT INTOLERANCE
Is the ideal scale theory sufficiently definite to provide stability
and sufficiently flexible to prevent intolerance? Because it is
assumed on faith there is no dogmatic insistence on the validity of
the ideal standard. The ideal scale theory is, therefore, tolerant of
the discussion of other possible ideal standards which might some-
day replace the existing standard. Nonetheless, the ideal scale of
values as an ideal standard is sufficiently comprehensive so as not
to need frequent revision. At the same time it is not too inflex-
ible and rigid. As previously stated, it 'has a built-in method for
handling change. The scale of values which is ideal for a society
at one time may not be ideal for the same society at another time.
As the ideal scale of values changes, the society's attempt to approx-
imate that ideal scale should also change-at least the society will
constantly be challenged to keep its own scale up to date. New
values will be added and old ones will be discarded as needed. All
this can be done without disregarding the scale itself. Thus, the
ideal scale theory is sufficiently rigid to provide considerable
certainty and sufficiently flexible to provide considerable flexi-
bility. It meets the fourth requisite for an ideal standard.
XI. THE IDEAL SCALE THEORY AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT
Let us now return to the question raised at the outset of this ar-
ticle, namely, whether natural law presents any meaningful limita-
tion or guidance in the interpretation of the ninth amendment. In
answering this question, let us substitute the ideal scale theory for
the natural law theories of the founding fathers. Let us substitute
the location on the ideal scale of values that is reserved for funda-
mental rights for the notion of inalienable, universal, and self-
evident natural rights envisioned by the founding fathers. In
effect, let us address ourselves to the question of whether the ideal
scale theory, as a modern variety of natural law, presents any
meaningful limitation or guidance in the interpretation of the ninth
amendment. We must then ask the further question of whether
this theory preserves or violates the intentions of the drafters of
the ninth amendment. To answer those questions, it is first
necessary to find the location on the scale of values that should be
reserved for the value implicit in the acceptance of certain fun-
damental rights.
XII. THE POSITION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ON THE SCALE OF VALUES
Our society accepts the necessity to protect certain fundamental
rights of the individual. Each fundamental right reflects a value.
Collectively, these rights occupy a sacred spot in the collective con-
science of the people; our society places great importance on the pro-
tection of these fundamental rights. The value reflected in the col-
lective importance of these fundamental rights is placed very high
on the society's scale of values. The values reflected in each funda-
mental right can be subsumed under this general value of collective
importance. This notion can be better illustrated in the following
chart which I believe is the best approximation of the ideal scale
of values that could be accepted in our American society at the
present time:
Scale ValuesE - The individual should be supreme.
Authority to govern should come from the people and this authority
- should be reviewed periodically by free elections. I
The powers of government should have certain built-in checks and
balances.
1) Separation of powers.
2) Federalist system of relatively strong local governments.
3) Civilian control of the military.4) A written constitution to delineate and articulate powers ofgovernment and to proscribe others not specifically mentioned.
Certain fundamental rights of the individual should be protected.
1) Freedom of speech and press.
2) Freedom of assembly and right to petition the government for
redress of grievances.
3) Freedom of Religion.
4) Right of equal protection of the laws.
5) Right to life, liberty, and property and protection from their
denial without due process of law.
6) Right to vote regardless of sex, race, color, creed, national
origin, or failure to pay poll tax.
7) Right of privacy, protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures and protection from self-incrimination.
8) Rights of criminal accused:
a) To have the assistance of counsel.
b) To have a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury in
the district wherein the crime was committed.
c) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
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d) To be confronted with the witnesses against him and to
have compusory process to obtain witnesses in his favor.
e) To be free from excessive bail and from cruel and unusual
punishment.
f) To be protected from double jeopardy.
g) To be protected from the use of coerced confessions.
h) To have sufficient time to prepare his defense.
i) To be protected from domination of the court by a mob.
J) To be protected from conviction of treason except upon the
the testimony of at least two witnesses.
9) Right to a trial by jury in certain cases.
10) Right to be protected from ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder.
11) Right to be protected from taking of property for public use
without just compensation.
12) Right to be protected from peacetime quartering of troops in
private homes.
13) Freedom to travel and to communicate.
The government should have sufficient power to effectively:
1) Protect the citizens from crime.
2) Protect the citizens from foreign enemies.
3) Protect the citizens from undue economic exploitation by
others.
4) Protect the citizens from arbitrary interferences with their
lives and property by others.
5) Promote the education and general welfare of all of the people.
The Government should encourage the protection of freedom and[
promotion of general welfare in other parts of the world.
tc.
In the above scale the most important values are placed at the
top and each mark on the scale assigns a location or order to the
value represented by that mark in relation to the other values on
the scale. This scale is not the ideal scale of values for our Ameri-
can society, nor is it the scale that I think most closely approximates
the ideal scale.9 7 Instead, it is the scale that I think would have
the best chance of receiving widespread acceptance by the people
of the United States. Each person undoubtedly has his own scale
of values, nevertheless there is general agreement on certain basic
97. As stated earlier, I believe the ideal scale includes the right to be
protected from capital punishment high on the list of fundamental rights.
I doubt, however, that there is sufficient widespread acceptance at the pres-
ent time of this value to give it a place on the scale in the box reserved
for fundamental rights. But see, People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493
P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
(see the concurring opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall).
values and their relative importance.9 8 There may be disagreement
as to the manner in which each value is stated, and there may be
disagreement as to whether one value should be placed above or
below another value on the scale. For example, the right to travel
may conflict with environmental rights, just as the right to privacy
may conflict with certain first amendment rights. However, de-
spite disagreements, sufficient general consensus can be achieved to
enable us to proceed on this basis.
The box reserved for fundamental rights is placed high on the
scale. Certain fundamental rights are placed inside this box. How-
ever, since only a certain number of rights are entitled to the cloak
of protection afforded to fundamental rights, there is room inside
this box for only a certain number of rights. Such a limitation pro-
vides a meaningful restraint for such broad constitutional phrases
as "due process of law" and "other [rights] retained by the people."
Once a right is considered fundamental, it is entitled to constitu-
tional recognition under these phrases. Rights not so considered
are not entitled to such recognition. Assuming a workable method
can be found for determining which rights are fundamental, such
an approach is definite and certain. Contrary to Justice Black's
contention, it does not allow judges to "roam at will in the limitless
area of their own beliefs" in interpreting the broad constitutional
phrases just mentioned.9 9
The question of which rights are fundamental should, under the
ideal scale theory, be determined by searching for those rights
whose protection is essential to achieve the perfection of man.
Each citizen will undoubtedly have a slightly different opinion, but
again there should be general agreement on most of the rights-
there should be sufficient consensus to permit our society to act
on the basis of the fundamental rights so selected. This procedure
is not entirely unlike the procedure envisioned by Justice Goldberg
in determining which rights are fundamental. In the Griswold v.
Connecticut'"° he made the following statement:
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left
at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private no-
tions. Rather, they must look to the 'traditions and [collective)
conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so
rooted [there] . . .as to be ranked as fundamental. . .. '101
The task of determining which rights are fundamental has fre-
98. See supra notes 64, 65, and 83. See also Harvey, The Challenge of
the Rule of Law, 59 MICH. L. REv. 603, 608 (1961).
99. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 525 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
100. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
101. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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quently been undertaken by Supreme Court Justices. As early as
1908, Justice Moody set forth the following question in his attempt
to define the scope of "due process": "Is it a fundamental principle
of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free govern-
ment and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such a govern-
ment.' 10 2 In 1926, Justice Van Devanter stated that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires state action to be con-
sistent with "the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.' 10 3
This same language was quoted by Justice Sutherland to substan-
tiate his conclusion that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment required the assistance of counsel for the accused facing
the death sentence in Powell v. Alabama.104
Justice Cardozo, in Snyder v. Massachusetts, stated that Massa-
chusetts was free to regulate the procedure of its courts as it wished
"unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental."'0 5 Again in Palko v. Connecticut, Justice Cardozo spoke
of rights "found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
and rights which are "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty."'01 6 Justice Roberts, in Betts v. Bardy, spoke of a constitu-
tional denial as one which constituted "a denial of fundamental
fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.' 0 7 Justice
Frankfurter spoke of "those canons of decency and fairness which
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples."10 8  In
the same case he stated:
The judicial judgment in applying the Due Process Clause must
move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to
be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment.
The fact that judges among themselves may differ whether in a
particular case a trial offends accepted notions of justice is not dis-
proof that general rather than idiosyncratic standards are ap-
plied.' 0 9
102. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908).
103. Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
104. 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932).
105. 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
106. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
107. 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
108. Malenski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
109. Id.
In Haley v. Ohio, Justice Frankfurter spoke of "deeply rooted feel-
ings of the community."u 0 And in Wolfe v. Colorado, he spoke of
a right which was "basic to free society" and which was "implicit
in 'the concept of ordered liberty.' ",
Justice Black dismissed all of these statements as "catchwords
and catch phrases" employed by judges to strike down laws which
offend their notions of natural justice." 2 When viewed in connec-
tions with the notion of a limited bundle of rights each of which
is cloaked with special protection-in other words, when viewed in
connection with the ideal scale theory-they are much more than
mere catchwords. They are an attempt to define those rights which
the society has singled out for special protection because there is
general agreement that these rights are basic to the perfection of
man.
XIII. THE NINTH AMENDMENT AS A VEHICLE FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE IDEAL SCALE THEORY
It should be immediately apparent that most of the rights listed
in the box reserved for fundamental rights in the above chart are
already written into the document which contains the fundamental
law of the land, namely, the Constitution of the United States.
There are, however, a few significant additions and one significant
omission.
By the framers' own admission, the Bill of Rights and the Consti-
tution did not contain an exhaustive list of fundamental rights.
113
Many of the rights that were listed by the framers were rights that
they were painfully aware of because the former British sovereigns
had attempted to deny these rights to the colonists. Thus, the
British had forced the colonists to accept the quartering of British
troops in their homes without their consent"14 and this prompted the
third amendment which states that no soldier should be quartered
in any house without the consent of the owner in time of peace. The
British customs officials obtained unlimited "writs of assistance"
which gave them authority to break into any house and any trunk,
110. 332 U.S. 596, 604 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
111. 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
112. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 n.4 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
113. Madison, speech in the House of Representatives, 8 June 1789, in I
ANNALS OF CONGRESS (GALES & SEATON ed. 1834). See reprint in PATTER-
SON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 93, 115 (1955). See also speech by
Mr. Jackson of Georgia, id. at 119.
114. See Quartering Act, Act of Parliament of 24 March 1765, in Docu-
MENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 61 (COMMAGER ed. 1949).
[VOL. 2: 270, 1975] The Ninth Amendment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
chest or other receptacle at any time to search for contraband
goods. This prompted the fourth amendment which prohibited un-
reasonable searches and seizures. 115 The British, however, did not
attempt to prohibit travel and communications within and between
the states; thus, it apparently never occurred to the framers that
the right to travel and the right to send and receive communications
could be just as important as the right to be protected from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures." 6 According to Lieber:
The right of freely corresponding is unquestionably one of the
dearest as well as most necessary of civilized man; yet, our fore-
fathers were so little acquainted with a police government, that no
one thought of enumerating the sacredness of letters along with the
freedom of speech and the liberty of the press. The liberty of cor-
respondence stands between the two; free word, free letter, free
print. The framers did not think of it, as the first law-makers of
Rome are said to have omitted the punishment of perricide.11 7
For this reason, the right to travel and communicate should be
included within the box of fundamentally protected rights.
Of perhaps even greater importance, however, the bundle of
rights which are considered fundamental should not become too
rigid. The ideal scale theory recognizes that the values appropriate
for a society at one time may not be appropriate for the same
society at another time. Thus, the values that were appropriate for
the society in 1789 may not be appropriate for the society of today.
According to Justice Frankfurter:
Basic rights do not become petrified as of any one time, even
though, as a matter of human experience, some may not too
rhetorically be called eternal verities. It is of the very nature of
115. See LASSON, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-78 (1937). See Roscoe Pound's list of
eight grievances which preoccupied the founding fathers in POUND, THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 71-72 (1957).
116. The importance of the right to travel was not fully appreciated until
the twentieth century when restrictions were placed on external travel of
members of the Communist Party. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 193 (1956). However, this right
seems to be enjoying the status of a fundamental right today. See Con-
struction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 375
F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966).
117. LIEBER, CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 90-91 (2d ed. 1859).
a free society to advance in its standards of what is deemed reason-
able and right.118
The change in the fundamental rights appropriate for a society
should be minimal; nevertheless, it is necessary. For example,
when our Constitution and Bill of Rights were drafted, the framers
either were not aware of the right of privacy or did not believe it
was sufficiently important to be cloaked with constitutional protec-
tion. Indeed, the pioneers who pushed across the Appalachian
Mountains, and into the West to settle the growing country had
little use for a fundamental right protecting their privacy. If any-
thing, they had too much privacy. Eighty years after the closing
of the frontier, however, seventy-three per cent of the people live
in urban areas, 119 and all of the people are subject to easy surveil-
ance by means of incredible electronic devices. It is now apparent
to many people that the right of privacy should receive equal im-
portance with the other fundamental rights protected by the consti-
tution; some believe it is even more important than the others.1 20
The ideal scale theory is flexible enough to receive the right of pri-
vacy into the bundle of rights that receive special protection. It is
widely accepted today as a fundamental right; thus, it is included
in the box of fundamental rights.
The right of the people to keep and bear arms as protected by
the second amendment, however, was not included. Because of the
nature of the modern weapons-even small arms-it is doubtful
that a genuine consensus of opinion could be obtained in support
118. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). An example of the changes
in values and priorities which time has wrought is in the area of the envi-
ronment. Many have asserted that the right to a clean environment may
be a fundamental right by necessity. The courts have yet to fully accept
this thesis. See YANNACONE, ENVIRONIENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES § 3:3,
at 8 (Supp. 1974); Beckman, The Right to a Decent Environment Under
the Ninth Amendment, 46 L.A. BAR. BULL. 415 (1971).
119. See DEPT. OF COMMERcE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 173, at 17.
120. "They [the makers of the Constitution] conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis dissenting). Cited with approval by
Goldberg, J., in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965). The right
of privacy is currently undergoing examination in areas not necessarily con-
sidered by the founding fathers. Much confusion as to just what should
be considered constitutionally protectable in this area has been evident.
For the right to privacy as it relates to abortions, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970); relating
to marriage see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); relating to procreation
see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); for an excellent article of
the expanding right of privacy see On Privacy! Constitutional Protection
For Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670 (Oct. 1973).
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of this right today. The dangers to society of allowing the uncon-
trolled distribution of high powered rifles among the citizenry are
apparent.
The Constitution itself provides for no method of discarding out-
dated rights from the category of fundamental rights short of
amendment to the Constitution. The courts may modify this
rigidity to a certain extent by giving a very restricted and limited
interpretation to the constitutional provision in question. The Con-
stitution does, however, expressly provide for the recognition of
those rights which society considers fundamental but which were
overlooked by the founding fathers or were not considered suffi-
ciently important by the founding fathers at that time to include
them within the constitutional enumeration. Thus, the ninth
amendment states, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people."
To the founding fathers, the rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights constituted a partial list of those "essential elements of the
law of nature," which constituted an absolute limitation on the
powers of government. These rights were considered the prime
requisites of free government and were the rights reserved to the
people when the political compact, that brought the people out of
the state of nature, was entered into.121 Neither the legislature nor
any other agency of government could modify or evade these
rights. 12 2 In spite of this fact, there was considerable hesitancy to
adopt a formal declaration listing these sacred rights. The reason
for this hesitancy is found in the nature of the Constitution itself;
the Constitution set forth a federal government of limited powers
and only the powers expressly listed in the Constitution were to be
legal. Individual rights were reserved to the people by the very
manner in which federal powers were granted.123 For this reason
many of the founding fathers considered a separate declaration of
fundamental rights unnecessary and perhaps even dangerous. It
was feared that the enumeration of limitations and exceptions to
121. BURNS, JAMES MADISON-PHILOSOPHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 166
(1938) [hereinafter cited as BURNS]; LOCKE, Two TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT
189 § 135 (COOK ed. 1947).
122. Burns, supra note 113.
123. Madison, Letter of Jefferson in 1788 in 1 MADISON, WIrINGS 424
(Cong. ed. 1865).
powers that were not even granted might provide a pretext for
claiming more power than was granted. 124 It was also feared that
by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow, by implication, that those rights
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the
hands of the General Government, and were consequently in-
secure.125 (Emphasis supplied.)
The author of the Bill of Rights, James Madison, admitted that this
was "one of the most plausible arguments" made against its adop-
tion.12 6  The ninth amendment was drafted for the purpose of
guarding against this possibility.127
The language of the ninth amendment, therefore, amounts to a
realization that the drafters were unable to make a complete enu-
meration of all the fundamental rights that would ever need protec-
tion. In this connection it should be noted that Madison was deeply
concerned that the institutions and laws enacted by one generation
should not be rigidly imposed upon succeeding generations. 2
Thus, it seems quite clear that the ninth amendment was intended
to take cognizance of the rights which were considered by the
people to be just as fundamental as the enumerated rights but
which were either overlooked when the original enumeration was
made or were not considered important enough to be included at
the time of this enumeration. The ninth amendment is an excellent
vehicle for giving constitutional recognition to rights which the
society considers fundamental and wishes to cloak with special pro-
tection but which are not included in the constitutional enumera-
tion of fundamental rights. To this extent, the ninth amendment
is a vehicle for implementing the flexible ideal scale theory. At the
same time, the ideal scale theory, I believe, preserves the exact in-
tent of the founding fathers in regard to the treatment of funda-
mental rights.
CONCLUSION
Thus, to meet the objections levied against the neo-scholastic
natural law philosophy of Father William Kenealy and the neo-
124. BURNS, supra note 113; THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 579 (COOK ed. 1761)(A. Hamilton). See also POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 65 (1957).
125. Madison, speech in the House of Representatives, June 8, 1789, in
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS (GALES & SEATON ed. 1834). See reprint in PATTER-
SON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 93, 115 (1955). See also speech by
Mr. Jackson of Georgia. Id. at 119.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. BURNS, supra note 113, at 69-70.
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Kantian natural law philosophy of Rudolph Stammler, I have
presented an alternative theory. It is based not on a universal and
immutable principle but on an assumed premise. This assumed
premise is what I call an ideal standard. I have then proposed an
ideal standard which I think best satisfies the necessary requisites
for an ideal standard. It is expressed in the following words:
There does exist an ideal scale of values which presents the best
guide for organizing a society at any one time. Implicit in this
standard is the basic assumption that there is a perfect method of
organizing man's social behavior. This I accept on faith. I think it
is a reasonable assumption and one which can receive widespread
acceptance because to deny it would be to destroy the motive nec-
essary for continuing our efforts to seek a perfect method of organi-
zation. Once it is accepted, the ideal standard can be used to eval-
uate the positive law. Widespread acceptance, however, is crucial
to its effectiveness.
A summary of the ways in which the ideal scale of values meets
the requisites for a good ideal standard reveals nine advantages of
this theory of law over the traditional positive theory of law.129
First, the acceptance of an ideal scale of values prevents value
anarchy, namely, it gives the lawmakers and leaders of the society
a starting point for sorting and evaluating all the values that legiti-
mately contend for acceptance in a complex society. Second, it en-
courages and stimulates constant improvement of the legal system
by requiring a constant evaluation of both the laws and the basic
values in an effort to achieve the ideal. Third, it challenges the
society to try to discover the perfect method of organizing man's
social behavior. In other words, it challenges man to seek the per-
fection of man. Fourth, it provides a much more noble and honor-
able purpose for law than to provide the sovereign with a tool to
control the people according to his own desires. Fifth, it sufficiently
focuses the attention of all lawmakers on the needs of man to dis-
courage tyranny and arbitrary laws. Sixth, it sufficiently focuses
the attention of all lawmakers to the needs of society to discourage
anarchy or laws that undermine the minimal public order. Sev-
enth, it provides a higher law above the positive law to which
the lawmakers are responsible, thereby lessening the tempta-
129. I refer primarily to the positive law of John Austin, Hans Kelsen
and their followers.
tion for dictatorial control. Eighth, it provides a healthy climate
for the discussion of all values and even all possible ideal
standards. And finally, it places faith in man's ability to organize
his own volitions and to achieve a satisfactory destiny.
The ideal scale theory does provide a theory of law which can act
as a restraint on the open ended provision of the ninth amendment
in much the same way the founding fathers intended. At the same
time this theory can still be acceptable in today's world of realism
and scientific achievement. Instead of looking to natural rights
which are self-evident, inalienable, immutable and universal, we
look to rights which are implicit in the acceptance of certain basic
values. On society's scale, the scale Which by common consensus
the people of society believe most closely approximates the ideal
scale of values for that society, these rights are placed in a box re-
served for fundamental rights. The box of fundamental rights is
high on the scale of values and there is only a limited amount of
space inside the box; only a limited number of rights are cloaked
with special protection. The scale is sufficiently flexible, however,
to allow that minimal change which is necessary to the basic stand-
ards of any society. The ninth amendment acts as an excellent
vehicle to implement this theory by allowing the addition of certain
rights to the bundle of fundamental rights as they receive sufficient
acceptance by the community to merit such additional recognition.
At the same time, the legislative history of the Bill of Rights and
the ninth amendment shows that such an interpretation of the
ninth amendment is consistent with the original intention of the
founding fathers in regard to both the ninth amendment and the
fundamental rights enumerated in the Constitution in general.
Roscoe Pound once wrote:
The declaration of natural rights in the Ninth Amendment is not
something to be relegated to a lumber room of outworn juristic or
political ideas. The task is rather to make the natural law and
natural rights as believed in by the founders of our polity effective
political and legal instruments in the society of today.'3 0
I believe the ideal scale theory would accomplish this task.
130. See Roscoe Pound's introduction in PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH
AMENDAIENT iii (1955); In this book, Patterson accepts the natural law of
the founding fathers without discussion.
